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Clinical Realism: Simulated
Hearings Based on Actual Events in
Students' Lives
Samuel R. Gross
This essay describes a novel clinical format, a simulation course that is
based on students' testimony about actual events in their own lives. The two
main purposes of the course, however, are not novel. First, I aim to teach
the students to be effective trial lawyers by instructing them in the
techniques of direct examination and cross-examination and by making
them sensitive to the roles of the other courtroom players: the witness, the
judge, and the jury. Second, I hope to encourage the students to think
about the social and ethical consequences of our method of trying lawsuits.
Traditionally, clinical law exercises come in two distinct formats: those
that employ real cases and those that use simulations. There is, of course,
enormous variation within each type. A "real case" can be the routine filing
of a homestead exemption or a ten-year-long test-case battle. A law student
working on a real case might be the sole representative of the party or one
of dozens of privates in a small legal army. A "simulation" can be anything
from an unprepared fifteen-minute interview to a two-day trial that is the
culmination of a semester of work and preoccupation. Despite this range,
the line between the two categories seems clear. "Real cases" have outcomes
that determine the interests of real clients; they are driven (or ought to be)
by the interests of the clients, and their timing is set primarily to suit the
convenience of the parties and of the court or agency involved. "Simula-
tions" have no significant consequences except to the students and their
instructors; they are driven (or ought to be) by the interests of the class, and
their timing is designed to fit the calendar and the pedagogical goals of the
course.
Each method has adherents, and the arguments on each side are
undoubtedly familiar. The advocates of real cases say that even "[a]t best,
simulated litigation offers verisimilitude rather than verity"' and that some
of the most important components of the practice of law cannot be
reproduced at all: the responsibility of the lawyer to the client, the
unpredictable emotions of parties and witnesses, the surprising malleability
of human memory, etc. As a result, simulations provide a distorted image
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of litigation. Because they include no witnesses with real memories and no
parties with actual interests, they inevitably overemphasize the game-like
aspects of litigation and teach students that truth is unimportant or
nonexistent and that accommodation and reconciliation are boring.2
The advocates of simulation, however, argue that in practice real-life
clinics are limited, expensive, and unreliable. Students can be given primary
responsibility for simple, routine cases, but focusing on such "small" cases
limits the range and the depth of the learning experience. Worse, small
cases are notoriously unpredictable. As often as not, trials are postponed
beyond the end of the semester, clients disappear, claims settle, and the
students never get a chance to try their wings.3 Larger cases, in contrast,
often include novel and challenging intellectual issues. They are also
generally more predictable, but only in the sense that they predictably
outlast the tenure of any particular law school class. Students cannot be
given substantial responsibility for such cases, and any individual student is
likely to become acquainted with no more than a small happenstance
portion of the entire history of a big case.4 Simulated cases, however, can be
designed to fit educational goals, and to start after the beginning of the
term and end before finals. More important, students can be given
complete responsibility for even the most complex simulated problems,
because only they stand to lose by their errors, and not badly at that.
Both sets of criticisms appear to be correct. Indeed, because the range of
quality within each category is greater than any possible overall difference
between them, I see no general reason to prefer one bundle of advantages
and disadvantages to the other. Nor are the two approaches mutually
exclusive; most real-case clinics include some simulated instruction, and
some teachers try to give equal weight to both elements.5 From what little
I have seen, however, it seems to me that elaborate and sophisticated
clinical simulations cannot even be attempted with real cases waiting in the
wings, and that, under any circumstances, the real always tends to undercut
the make-believe.
My own experience in clinical teaching is entirely with simulated cases,
but the cases are in one respect unusual. Unlike most other clinical
simulations, mine include no scripted witnesses. In one form or another, I
have always devised exercises that make use of the actual memories and
experiences of the people whose role it is to testify.
The course in which I first tried out this format focused on the use of
expert testimony. The hearings-change of venue motions and motions to
suppress identification in simulated felony prosecutions-were based on
2. Id.; Kenney Hegland, Moral Dilemmas in Teaching Trial Advocacy, 32 J. Legal Educ.
69, 73-81 (1982); Steven Lubet, What We Should Teach (But Don't) When We Teach
Trial Advocacy, 37 J. Legal Educ. 123 (1987).
3. Association of American Law Schools, Curriculum Study Project, Training for the
Public Professions of the Law: 1971, 1971 AALS Proceedings, pt. 1, § 2, at41; Hegland,
supra note 2, at 71; see Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Report from a CLEPR
Colony, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 581, 589 (1976).
4. George S. Grossman, Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis, 26J. Legal Educ.
162, 178-79 (1974); Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 3, at 590-91.
5. See, e.g., Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 3, at 592-96.
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files of actual criminal cases. The experts who testified (psychologists,
sociologists, and statisticians) were people who were (or soon would be)
qualified to testify in real cases. Their testimony was based on documents
and other information that was similar to material they might receive in
preparation for actual pretrial hearings; their relationship to the issues and
the attorneys was very similar to that of experts who testify in real courts.
The course on which I intend to focus-somewhat arbitrarily tided
Evidence Workshop-differs from the expert witness course in several
ways. It focuses on the testimony of ordinary lay witnesses-the students in
the class themselves. It is a far less taxing course. In some respects it is less
predictable. Evidence Workshop does, however, preserve the central struc-
tural feature of the earlier course: simulated litigation with witnesses who
testify from their own actual knowledge and experience. This format
captures many of the virtues of instruction with real cases, while preserving
the control and the freedom that are only possible with simulations.
I have taught the course three times, once at Stanford and twice at the
University of Michigan. It has been a success at both schools. For a clinical
course, it is relatively easy to stage. It is a ten-student seminar that requires
one instructor, the use of a moot courtroom, and video equipment and
personnel adequate for split-screen taping of two people at one time. It
takes relatively little of the instructor's or the students' time (as clinical
courses go)-on each side, about as much as a substantial lecture course.
The format is both economical and uncommonly useful for clinical teach-
ing.
I. The Structure of the Course
The course has three main features. First, it centers on a series of
courtroom simulations (ten in all), each of which consists of a vignette from
a trial or hearing: the testimony of a single witness on direct and
cross-examination, based on some actual experience of the person in that
role. The simulations are open-ended and range in length from half an
hour to more than an hour and a half. Second, all roles in the simulations-
direct examiner, cross examiner, witness, judge, and jury-are played by
students in the course; each student occupies each of the speaking roles
once and sits in the jury box the rest of the time. Third, each simulation is
reviewed by the entire class, once in court immediately after the hearing
and then again several days later, in class, with the help of videotapes. How
these elements fit together should become apparent in the following
discussion of the exercises.
A. Devising the Simulations
1. Finding Appropriate Experiences for Student Testimony
The central problem in teaching the course is to find an experience in
the life of each student that will serve as the basis for a simulation. What I
look for is an event that the student participated in or witnessed that might
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have become the subject of litigation. In one of the twenty-nine simulations
I have organized so far, the student had in fact testified about the event in
court (he was the complaining witness in a criminal prosecution for assault
and battery); in a few others, it would not have been surprising if the story
had ended up in court. For the most part, however, the events held no
realistic potential for litigation-typically because the stakes were too small.
To make the simulated litigation more plausible, I frequently alter facts.
Thus, if the student has witnessed a potentially serious accident that did not
actually result in significant injuries-a seeing-eye dog of questionable
disposition knocked down a baby on hard pavement, an amusement park
boat went down a water ride the wrong way-I will assume that the victim
of the mishap was injured, but in a manner that would not have been
apparent to the observer. However, because one of the major objectives of
the exercise is to work with the student witness's own memories, I never
change facts to which the witness could actually testify. In particular, I am
careful not to alter the dates of events; if something happened five years
ago, that is how it will be described in testimony. Most gaps of this sort are
within the range of delay that is common in American litigation; occasion-
ally, however, it helps to devise an explanation. In one criminal case, for
example, I explained a seven-year delay between the alleged crime (drug
dealing) and the simulated trial by assuming that although the defendant
had been indicted promptly, he had fled and was only arrested within the
year preceding the exercise.
The process of finding testimonial events is the single most challenging
task I face as instructor. The basic method, of course, is to interview each
student and ask about his or her past. In the interviews, I look for
experiences that meet three criteria: (1) the student must have done or seen
something that could have been of significant importance in a plausible law
suit; (2) the testimony that the student could present must be of reasonable
scope-roughly between fifteen minutes and one hour on direct examina-
tion; (3) there must be some basis for impeaching the witness. Thus, for
example, I could not use the evidence of a student who happened to see a
man shot by a gunman in a passing truck, apparently as part of a gang war,
because he could not identify the killers, and contested identification of an
absent person would not work in these exercises in any event. If the murder
had come to trial, this student's testimony about the time, place, and
manner of the shooting might have been extremely important, but it would
not have been open to any realistic challenge.
The interviews that uncover the students' experiences are open-ended
events. The students are told about the structure of the simulated hearings
before the semester begins, first in the course description and then by
memo. At the first class meeting, I expand on the descriptions and talk
about the interviewing process through which the problems are designed.
I ask them to try to remember events in their lives that might be
appropriate for testimony, and I mention types of incidents that have
worked in the past: automobile accidents, other accidents, assaults, employ-
ment discrimination, etc. I then schedule individual meetings with the
students, which last anywhere from half an hour to an hour and a half.
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About half the students come prepared with one or more perfectly suitable
vignettes. Most of the rest remember an equally usable event after some
probing. I go through their adult lives stage by stage, asking questions that
might lead to something useful: Where did you work that summer? Did you
get into any disputes with your employer? Did anybody else who worked
there? Where did you live? Did you have any problems with your landlord?
And so forth. Once or twice a semester the initial interview fails and a
follow-up interview does not solve the problem. When that happens I
swallow my anxiety, schedule the student to testify late in the semester, and
put the problem off until a second set of interviews three or four weeks
before his or her appearance as a witness. So far, this delaying tactic has
been successful-perhaps because the experience of seeing the first several
hearings has jogged the students' memories or stimulated my inquisitorial
imagination.
One special danger is the possibility of invading the students' privacy.
Litigation, as we know, tends to focus on unpleasant events-accidents,
fights, family disputes, misunderstandings, frauds, crimes-a catalogue of
misconduct, failure, and abuse. It can be very unpleasant for some students
to be interviewed-much less to testify-about some of the foolish, illegal,
or embarrassing things that they have done or that others have done to
them. Fortunately, this does not apply to a large range of litigable events.
Most students are perfectly happy to talk about common failures and crises:
being tricked by a salesman, for example, or rear-ending another car at
rush hour. In fact, the experience of testifying in public about one's own
stupidity is one of the peculiar values that the course can confer: many
(perhaps most) witnesses learn what it feels like, but few lawyers have
shared their predicament. Some obvious subjects for realistic testimony,
however, are extremely painful for the students involved-their parents'
divorce or the death of a sibling, for example-and talking publicly about
other incidents, such as drug use in college, can also pose a real risk of
self-incrimination.
I did not foresee this problem. I learned about it the first time I taught
the course, when a student was upset by the interview I conducted
(although not by the testimony she ultimately gave). Since then, I have
taken great pains to avoid the danger. I describe the probing nature of the
interviews at the initial class meeting, warn the students that this is a
potentially intrusive process, and tell them that there is no reason to talk
about anything that they would rather avoid. I remind each student of the
issue when I meet with them individually (except for those who come
prepared with trouble-free experiences to use as the basis for their
testimony). Finally, I bring the problem up again whenever an interview
produces a possible subject for testimony that strikes me as touchy. In such
cases I ask the students to consider whether they would be comfortable
talking about the matter in front of their classmates. I tell them a bit about
the process of discovery and preparation that leads up to the hearings and
emphasize that it is their decision. Sometimes I advise them against using a
HeinOnline  -- 40 J. Legal Educ.  325 1990
Journal of Legal Education
particular experience; otherwise I suggest that they take a couple of days to
think it over. Some students have chosen to go ahead; as far as I can tell,
they have not regretted it.
My method of assigning students to their roles as witnesses is not an easy
one. Handing out scripts would be much more convenient. But the benefits
are more than adequate compensation. The students' lives are an endless
source of new issues and interesting contexts for courtroom problems. The
scenes they describe are both real and accessible to their fellow students.
Some clinical teachers report that their law students are reluctant to play
the role of witness in simulations, or incompetent to do so, or both;6 neither
problem arises in this course. Most important, the students' performances
as witnesses are extremely useful to themselves and to the class as a group.
2. Framing the Hearings
After I have found an appropriate event for a hearing, I ask the student
to write a short (200-700 word) "witness statement" describing the event. I
tell the students that their statements should be based on their current
memories and dated when they are actually written; beyond that, I give
them no guidelines on form or content. Occasionally, I have to ask a
student to rewrite the initial witness statement; once or twice I have realized
after reading such a statement that the proposed hearing would not work
after all. Otherwise, the statement becomes the starting point for the
exercise. Working from it, I write a memorandum to the class in the
following form:
Memorandum
TO: Class, Evidence Workshop
FROM: Sam Gross
RE: Hearing No. 1
The first hearing in this course will be in the case of Romano v. Slayton, Civ. No.
88-103 1. This is a lawsuit by Ms. Joyce Romano against Ms. Maureen Slayton for
$2000 in property damage resulting from a car accident in which Ms. Romano's
car collided with the rear of a car driven by Ms. Slayton. Ms. Slayton has
counterclaimed for personal injuries and asked for $25,000 in damages. Both
parties left the scene of the accident without identifying themselves to each other.
Ms. Romano later hired an investigator who determined Ms. Slayton's identity,
and she filed the complaint.
The substantive law of the state of Michigan applies to this trial, except for its
no-fault auto insurance provisions. In other words, the case is subject to ordinary
rules of negligence, including a rule of comparative negligence. The Federal
Rules of Evidence apply.
The jury has been selected, and opening statements given. The presentation of
evidence will begin on Thursday, February 11, at 9:30 A.M., in the Washtenaw
County Circuit Court, Ann Arbor Division, sitting in the University of Michigan
Moot Courtroom, the Honorable Teresa Freedhof presiding. The first witness will
beJoyce Romano, who will be called by her own attorney, Ms. Nancy Hostler, and
cross-examined by the attorney for Ms. Slayton, Mr. Robert Marlow.
6. Id. at 596.
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A couple of aspects of the memorandum deserve brief mention. First, it
is helpful (but not essential) if the witness can be described as the first
witness in the case-not necessarily an inevitable or even a likely first
witness, but a plausible one. I have almost always been able to achieve this,
in part by case selection and in part by the manner in which I structure the
cause of action. Sometimes, however, it is necessary to provide a summary
of the testimony that preceded the witness-typically, the plaintiff's case in
situations in which the witness would only be called by the defense. Second,
I generally specify that the hearings are governed by the Federal Rules of
Evidence and by the substantive law of the jurisdiction in which the events
at issue occurred. I am perfectly willing, however, to alter the substantive
law (as I did in the memorandum) if it helps the simulation. I am even
prepared to write special simulated statutes, as long as the rules I create are
reasonably similar to some body of American law.
When I have witness statements from all or most of the students, I
schedule the hearings and assign the roles for the entire semester. This is
a short-term headache, dominated by three competing goals: (1) simpler
simulations and more experienced students should come first7 ; (2) students
should not be assigned two demanding roles (direct examiner and cross-
examiner, and, to lesser extent, witness) on successive weeks; (3) the same
two or three students should not work together repeatedly in different
exercises.
The cases have been quite varied. The list includes four automobile
accidents, five other accidents, three employment discrimination com-
plaints, five assaults (four criminal, one civil), three other criminal prose-
cutions (a liquor law violation, a trespass charge stemming from a political
demonstration, and a drug case), two landlord-tenant cases, and several
miscellaneous cases (a search-and-seizure motion, a consumer-fraud case,
an invasion of privacy case, a hearing on the competency of the student's
grandmother, and so forth).
B. Preparing the Hearings
1. General Preparation
The hearings begin in the fifth week of the semester. The first four
weeks are taken up by the process of constructing the exercises and by a
series of introductory classes. Evidence is a prerequisite for the course;
nonetheless, I give the students a set of readings on the law of evidence,
primarily as a form of review. I invite a series of guest speakers: a trial-court
judge and two or three attorneys who describe and demonstrate aspects of
litigation that we do not cover, such as opening statement, closing argu-
ment, and, if possible, jury selection. Finally, I put on a series of quick and
lightly prepared exercises on such basic courtroom techniques as develop-
ing a story on direct examination, using leading questions on cross-
examination, stating objections, marking exhibits and introducing them in
evidence.
7. To the extent that I accomplish the first goal, I also try to balance the tasks by giving
those experienced students more challenging exercises in their later appearances.
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For the most part, I use myself as the witness in the preliminary
exercises. I do so in part because I am available, but mostly in order to be
the first person in the class to be put in that uncomfortable position. I give
the students a witness statement that describes several arguable misrepre-
sentations by the seller of a house that I once bought, the negotiations in
which they occurred, and the troubles that followed. (To simplify the
preparation for these exercises, my statement is much more detailed than
those I ask the students to produce.) We meet as a group in the moot
courtroom, and the students take turns conducting short pieces of direct
examination and cross-examination, objecting to questions by other stu-
dents, presiding as judge, and sitting in the jury box. During the two or
three classes in this stop-and-go format, I make comments and suggestions
between segments and begin to involve the class as a group in the process
of review and evaluation.
2. Discovery and Witness Preparation
The specific preparation for each hearing begins about two-and-a-half
weeks in advance, when I circulate a memorandum to the class describing
the hearing (see the "Hearing No. 1" memorandum, reproduced earlier).
In addition, the two students in the roles of direct examiner and cross-
examiner each get a copy of the "witness statement," which is described in
a cover memorandum as a statement given by the witness to an investigator
working for the direct examiner and provided to the cross-examiner on
discovery. The examiners can use the statement to prepare for the hearing
and in court. In addition, each attorney has an opportunity to conduct a
formal interview of the witness, a procedure with no precise equivalent in
American trial practice but which is designed to function somewhat like a
deposition.
Each attorney is entitled to conduct one formal interview with the
witness at any mutually convenient time after preparation for the hearing
is underway. The opposing counsel has no right to attend the interview-in
fact, the interviewing attorney has the right to exclude her-although
opposing attorneys are generally told when the interviews are scheduled.
The interviews are tape-recorded. If the interviewing attorney wishes to use
any part of the record of the interview in court, then she must prepare a
transcript of that portion of the interview and give the transcript and the
tape to the witness; the witness must sign the transcript after verifying that
it is accurate, i.e., that it reflects what the witness said, regardless of what he
may have meant. (The purpose of the procedure is to avoid the cumbersome
process of impeaching a witness with a tape recording of a prior oral
statement). If the interviewing attorney does transcribe some portion of the
interview for possible use in court, she must also give the transcript and the
tape to her opposing counsel sufficiently in advance of trial so that her
opponent can transcribe any other portions of the tape and have them
signed by the witness as well. The attorney who conducts the interview may
transcribe portions of it or all of it; or she may transcribe none of it-in
which case her opponent will have no access to the tape. These options, of
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course, open up opportunities for tactical maneuvering. (In practice,
transcribing all is much more common than transcribing none).8
In addition to the formal interviews, the witnesses are free to do
anything they want to help either attorney (or both), or they may do
nothing more in advance of the hearing. I tell the witnesses to prepare for
trial and to deal with the attorneys as they would if they were testifying in
a real case-which is relatively easy because the testimony concerns real
events in their own lives. Several common patterns of preparation emerge,
of which the most frequent is the simplest. About half the time the witness
is a party or is otherwise closely identified with the direct examiner; if so,
the cross-examiner will conduct a formal interview but the direct examiner
will not, and the witness will prepare informally with the direct examiner
but have no informal contact with the cross-examiner. Sometimes, however,
the witness is essentially neutral and equally available (or unavailable) to
both sides; sometimes the witness's allegiance is affected by the process of
pretrial preparation itself (a useful lesson). Occasionally, the witness is
hostile to the party represented by the direct examiner and correspondingly
friendly to the opposing side; other times, he is hostile to both sides. Each
combination has significant (and usually predictable) consequences for the
pattern of pretrial discovery and preparation.
3. Documents
Each examining attorney is required to prepare two documents before
trial. The first is something I call a "statement in lieu of an opening
statement." The purpose of this document is to provide a context for the
testimony of the witness who will actually appear-to present the attorney's
theory of the case as a whole so that the judge and jury can follow what she
is attempting to do in this piece of it. The statement is supposed to be short,
500 words or less. Its purpose (as far as I am concerned) is simply to provide
a backdrop for the action and not to attempt some written equivalent of the
art form of the opening statement. (Most students, however, err-
harmlessly-in that direction.) The statements are distributed to the entire
class, including all participants in the hearing, the day before the court date.
I review the statements in advance to make sure that the attorneys have not
gone overboard in one direction or another-typically by assuming the
existence of evidence outside the scope of the simulation that materially
affects the nature of the case.
The second document is a confidential description of what the attorney
actually hopes to accomplish in her examination of the witness and how she
plans to do so. These goals might range from straightforward and central
8. Some students are able to hire or persuade other people to do the transcribing, but most
have to cope with the chore on their own. Some complain about the amount of work
involved, which can be considerable, varying in proportion to the thoroughness of the
interview. On balance, however, I think the annoyance teaches them a good deal more
than they realize. Lawyers often seem to think that witness statements and similar
documents arrive on their desks with no human intervention. This attitude is not merely
insensitive to the roles of investigators and typists, it also reduces the lawyers' feel for the
information they receive and for the witnesses behind it. Doing the scut work oneself,
even once or twice, is an effective cure for that sort of myopia.
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purposes (presenting a useful story, establishing or undercutting the
credibility of the witness, etc.) to tactical manipulations (confusing the jury,
provoking the witness or the opposing attorney, and so forth). The
statements are supposed to be completed a day before the trial, copied, and
kept by their authors for distribution after the witness has testified.
One final category of pretrial document is optional. The attorneys are
permitted-indeed, encouraged-to deal with evidentiary issues by way of
motions in limine, when appropriate, or to make other preliminary
motions, and they are allowed to submit written motions and memoranda
in support of such motions. Any written documents that an attorney
intends to use in court, however, must be served on the opposing attorney
and filed with the judge by the end of the day before the hearing. In
practice, this option is used only rarely.
4. Advice and Instruction
I meet with each attorney twice before the hearing-generally, once
before the formal interview, if any, and once after. (I do not meet
individually with the witnesses or the judges.) I conceive of my role as that
of an experienced attorney helping a junior colleague handle one of her
own cases. Although I make suggestions, point out issues and problems,
and answer questions, I make no elaborate effort to think through each case
as though I were preparing it myself. The responsibility for gathering the
information that they will need, for making choices, and for preparing and
conducting the examination rests with the student lawyers.
Occasionally the students are tempted to try to do too much. Most legal
cases depend on the testimony of several witnesses, and sometimes even the
most important witness can only present a fragment of the story the
attorney wants to tell. In the confined context of these exercises, the
students may "reach" and try to cover more ground with the single witness
than they would ever do in a real case. I instruct them not to do this, but to
restrict themselves to the testimony that they would actually want to elicit
from the witness if they were putting on the entire case for the side they are
assigned to represent.9 The students are, however, instructed to hold back
nothing on the quality of their preparation. They are told to prepare their
examinations exhaustively-not merely as well as they would do in a real
case, but better. Given that they have no other obligations in these hearings,
this is a realistic demand and it is met.
There is one peculiar difficulty in my role at the preparation stage.
Because I act as advisor to both sides, I have to be careful not to pass
information from one side to the other inadvertently, or offer advice to one
attorney that is based on confidential information about her opponent's
plans. I think I do a passable job of maintaining this schizophrenic
separation, in part because I avoid taking notes during my meetings with
9. Once in a while the format requires making some reasonable assumptions about other
evidence that may be available, which the attorneys can then use in their quasi-opening
statements.
HeinOnline  -- 40 J. Legal Educ.  330 1990
Clinical Realism
the attorneys. The problem could be eliminated entirely-and the course
could be changed and improved in other respects-if it were cotaught by
two instructors.
C. Conducting the Hearings
The hearings are formal affairs. The attorneys and the witness are
expected to dress and behave as they would in court. The judge wears a
robe. I take the role of clerk; there is no court reporter (although there are
two camera operators). The procedure at the hearing is simple. The jury
assembles in the jury room; the other participants gather in court. The
camera operators start taping; the judge calls the case; the attorneys state
their appearances; and the judge asks if there are any motions to deal with
before the jury is brought in. After the motions (if any) are heard and
decided, the clerk brings in the jury and the judge asks the direct examiner
to call her first (or next) witness. The witness is called, sworn, and examined
following the usual rules of evidence and procedure. Occasionally, the jury
may be excluded while the judge hears extended argument on an objection,
or an offer of proof. 10 At the conclusion of the witness's testimony the judge
calls a recess, and the hearing is over.
The length of the hearings is indeterminate. There is usually at least one
motion in limine or other preliminary motion at the outset; typically the
motions take ten or fifteen minutes, but occasionally they last most of an
hour. The length of the testimony is extremely variable. Some witnesses are
off the stand in about half an hour; some are kept there for nearly two
hours. I schedule the exercises for blocks of three-and-a-half hours to
ensure enough time to complete the hearings and to review them, but we
rarely use the entire period.
D. Reviewing the Exercises
We review each exercise twice. The first review follows the hearing
directly. As soon as the examination of the witness is over the attorneys
distribute copies of the confidential descriptions of their goals, which
everyone reads during a ten-minute recess. We then reassemble for a
general discussion, and the participants resume their original positions (the
cameras remain off). I usually structure the discussion to some extent by
asking each student for his or her impressions, moving in turn from the
most passive participants to the most active-jury, judge, witness, cross-
examiner, direct examiner. The review is informal, and the attorneys and
10. I followed a slightly different procedure the first two times I taught the course: Thejury
would be seated in the jury box throughout the exercise and would hear arguments on
motions in limine, etc., but the judge and the lawyers would pretend that the jurors were
absent at the appropriate times. Eventually I decided that it added to the value of the
exercises to limit the jurors view to what they would actually see at trial, and to subject
them to the annoyance of temporary exclusions from the courtroom. To the extent that
the arguments the jury misses are important, we review them orally and on tape; see
section I(D). In the few nonjury hearings I have had, the would-be jurors are simply a
courtroom audience, but they are seated in the jury box.
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witnesses often respond to comments or questions from the others. I
frequently add my thoughts on issues that students bring up; occasionally
I will demonstrate how some aspect of the hearing could have been handled
or suggest that the participants redo a two- or three-minute segment in a
different manner. If I notice any significant issues that have not been
discussed, I mention them in closing and offer my overall impression of the
students' performances.
The second review takes place several days after the hearing. The class
meets for an hour and a half to watch and discuss sections of the videotape.
We start at the beginning, look at the first several minutes, and then focus
on three or four segments that I cull from the notes I take in court or that
the studeits suggest, stopping the tape repeatedly to discuss what we see.
We rarely get through the whole tape and usually see only a small portion.
Because the attorneys were in no position to see most of what was going on
at the hearing itself, they are required to watch the entire tape before the
second review, preferably together; the judge and the witness are encour-
aged to do the same.11
II. Discussion
The course that I have described has obvious limitations. It only covers
one aspect of trial practice, the preparation and examination of witnesses.
Other trial tasks-jury selection, opening statement, argument-are dis-
cussed but not attempted. Other basic functions that lawyers fill-
negotiating, drafting, counseling-are neglected entirely. The realism of
the course, one of its strongest points, is also limited. The witnesses are
real-that is, their testimony concerns real events in their lives-but there
are no parties with real interests to pursue, and the judges and jurors are
not the real functionaries who fill those roles. In fact, except for guest
speakers, the students never come in contact with any people outside the
closed group of the class itself. Finally, restricting each hearing to a single
witness limits the range of issues that can be pursued. In an actual trial, the
examination of a particular witness is often planned with a view to the
testimony of other witnesses-to support them, to impeach them, to fill in
gaps, etc. Such strategic planning is not possible within the confines of the
course.12
These are limitations, not faults. No course can accomplish everything.
Despite the limitations (and to some extent because of them), I believe this
is an excellent clinical format. It introduces elements of real cases into a
11. I should say a word about grades, because even in clinical courses students care deeply
about them. My policy has been to give letter grades based on my assessment of the
effort the student put into the course, which so far has meant that all the students have
received high grades. I am not sure I like this system. Pass/fail grading might be a more
honest approach. Several students, however, have urged me to retain letter grades in
order to ensure that all members of the class put in the necessary effort. In general, I
dislike that sort of coercion, but I think it may be justified in this context because a single
unprepared student can spoil the work of several others.
12. The course is also less predictable than traditional simulation clinics. Although the
unpredictability may rfiake the course more taxing for the instructor, I believe it is a
virtue.
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simulation course in a manner that is, in some respects, an improvement on
both traditional methods. In addition, it is a relatively cheap form of clinical
teaching-always a virtue-and, I expect, a flexible one as well. Other
clinical teachers could use elements of this method in clinical courses that
have an entirely different focus.' 3
The most obvious virtue of the course is that the students learn the
techniques of preparing and presenting evidence very well. My own
judgment is that all but one or two students a semester are transformed
over a period of ten weeks from absolute neophytes to competent begin-
ners. The students unanimously concur. 14
Several features of the course make it an efficient vehicle for skills
training. First, the students participate in the presentation of evidence from
all sides. They try out the familiar role of the active manipulator (lawyer),
but they also experience the position of the presumably passive object
(witness), and those of the professional and the nonprofessional audience
(judge and jury). In litigation (as in life in general), it is an enormous
advantage to learn how things look from other people's points of view. In
this format students get a chance to see for themselves how hard it can be
to follow testimony from the jury box or arguments from the bench. 15 For
example, one of the conspicuous trends in the course is a visible improve-
ment in the quality of the judging from the first hearing through the fourth
or fifth: the students learn from each others' mistakes to avoid common
judicial pitfalls (e.g., cutting off argument by the attorney you are predis-
posed to rule against). A parallel trend is less visible on the tapes but
ultimately more important: the students learn to be more effective at
framing arguments from the podium.
Second, although the tasks the students face are interesting and
difficult-at least for beginners-they are also circumscribed and manage-
able. Thus, the students can prepare their examinations with extreme care
and conduct them as well as their skill permits. I believe that this is more
13. Indeed, it would probably be a good thing if clinical instructors used real witnesses of
any sort in simulation exercises. Expert witnesses, of course, can come very close to
providing actual testimony in simulated settings, but other witnesses who testify
frequently about experiences in their work might do just as well. A few years ago, for
example, I organized a simulation based on testimony by a police officer about the arrest
of a drunk at a football game-an actual case in which charges were ultimately
dismissed. Although instructors who use exercises of this sort will have a hard time
replicating all the procedural steps of a trial (see, e.g., Hegland, supra note 2, at 70-72;
Kenneth S. Broun, Teaching Advocacy the N.I.T.A. Way, 63 A.B.A.J. 1220 (1977)), for
most purposes the gain in verisimilitude will greatly outweigh the cost in completeness,
especially for exercises that are embedded in real-client clinics.
14. The final assignment of the semester is to write an evaluation of the course in as much
detail as each student wishes. Although the reports are not anonymous-that is
impractical in a group of this size and nature-I do not look at them until after I have
handed in the grades. Most (if not all) of my observations about the value of the course
are reflected repeatedly in the students' comments (e.g., "One of the most frustrating
things about being a witness is feeling rushed and irrelevant . . . I was being asked to
tell my story and then no one really wanted to hear it . . . . I also didn't realize I was
capable of the same behavior until the next exercise when I was the attorney and I found
myself cutting my own witness off in mid-sentence during our interview.").
15. Hegland, supra note 2, at 77 n.15, suggests that students in clinical simulations should
be required to play the part of jurors. This format incorporates that suggestion and
carries it further.
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useful for the students than giving them tasks that are larger and more
complex, but which they cannot prepare exhaustively in the time available.
Student attorneys seem to learn more from doing things well than from
making mistakes (and they make quite enough mistakes to learn from in
any event). Painstaking work on the part of the student attorneys is also
important for the students who take the role of observers, the jury. They
learn much more from the reviews when the attorneys (whether they
perform well or not) have lavished their time on thinking about the hearing
in advance. But the most important benefit may be the habits that this
approach teaches. A student who conducts an excellent examination of a
witness learns that she is capable of that quality of work; she learns what it
looks and feels like and sounds like, and perhaps she begins to learn to
expect it of herself.
Third, the form of review in the class is extremely useful. Using
videotapes to review courtroom exercises is invaluable. Nothing else serves
nearly as well to help us see ourselves as others see us. Instant in-place
reviews add another dimension: the reactions of the participants and the
audience are first obtained when the hearing is fresh in their minds, and in
a setting in which parts of it can be redone. Ultimately, however, the most
important feature of the reviews is not their technology or their setting but
their social context. Over the course of the semester the students spend a lot
of time observing and commenting on the trial work of other students at
about their own level of skill and experience. The class provides a natural
and safe context for this process: the group is small and reasonably
intimate; the tasks of the active participants are well known to everyone;
and everyone goes through the process in every role. One of my fondest
hopes for the seminar is that the experience teaches students to continue to
do as practitioners what most litigators never do: to learn by watching and
listening to other attorneys.
Finally, the course is a useful vehicle for teaching trial skills because the
opportunities for control and review that are unique to simulations coexist
with testimony from real witnesses to actual events. Unlike scripted actors,
the student witnesses in the course testify from their own memories, with all
the attendant strengths and weaknesses. A witness's recollection sometimes
fails in the interval between her pretrial statement and her testimony; more
often it improves (or seems to). Unanticipated details and lines of inquiry
can be pursued, if the witness remembers. Because the witnesses are not
role-playing but testifying about their own experiences, their emotional
reactions are genuine. The biases, allegiances, and preferences that a
witness displays are her own; her personality and her manner are facts to
use or to contend with, as they would be in a real trial. Even the type of
anxiety the witnesses face-testifying about their own lives, in front of an
instructor and a group of fellow students in a serious professional
exercise-is not far removed from what they might experience in a real
court. As a result, their testimony has the feel of truth. More important,
there is a truth underlying their performances, and the attorneys preparing
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the hearings are able (within limits) to investigate it, to probe it, to develop
theories based on it, and to shape it.16
Clinical simulations have been criticized for inadvertently teaching
students that truth is nonexistent or unimportant; that litigation is a world
of make-believe in which facts are infinitely manipulable.' 7 In the simula-
tions I have described, however, truth is as it is found in the world at large,
and the testimony of the witnesses is manipulable only to the extent that it
could be manipulated in real litigation, neither more nor less.
The intrinsic reality of this form of simulation also improves the course
in another and more basic manner. Simulation clinics are sometimes
compared unfavorably with real-life clinics because students are less likely
to approach them seriously and to invest the time and effort that are
necessary to learn trial skills effectively. In extreme cases, this is said to
breed apathy; and even in less troubling circumstances, working on real
cases is supposed to make an imprint on the student's mind that will
inevitably outlast the mark of any simulation.' 8 My experience in this
course is to the contrary. I have seen no evidence of apathy-quite the
opposite. The students work hard and take their tasks very seriously; for
what it is worth, several students who had previously participated in
real-life clinics have told me that they learned more in these simulations.
Although, as I have said, the title of the course-Evidence Workshop-is
largely arbitrary, the course is in fact an effective context for teaching the
substantive law of evidence. It is hardly news to clinical teachers that the
basics of the structure and use of the law of evidence are far more easily
learned (or relearned) in a clinic (any relevant clinic) than in a classroom.
This clinical format has the additional advantage of generating a steady
stream of more complex evidence problems: What sort of evidence of a
conspiracy is necessary to permit the use of a hearsay statement as an
admission by a co-conspirator? 19 What facts will support an argument that
a former employee of the defendant is a witness "identified with the
opposing party" who may be interrogated with leading questions on direct
examination by the plaintiff?20 May portions of an out-of-court statement
that have no bearing on the interests of an unavailable declarant be
admitted in evidence over a hearsay objection because the statement as a
whole is a "statement against interest"? 2' And, of course, there are endless
variations on the most common problem of all: Does the likely prejudicial
impact of some item of evidence "substantially outweigh" its probative
value?22
16. See Lubet, supra note 2, at 137-38.
17. Hegland, supra note 2; Lubet, supra note 2. Hegland suggests mitigating the problem by
"put[ting] some truth into the problems"-by having the instructor provide scripted
witnesses and parties with secret information about the case or about their biases.
Hegland, supra note 2, at 77 n.15. It is not clear to me how this suggestion differs from
current practice, or how it would bring simulations any closer to the truth.
18. See, e.g., Robert J. Condlin, "Tastes Great, Less Filling": The Law School Clinic and
Political Critique, 36 J. Legal Educ. 45, 67 (1986).
19. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); McCormick on Evidence § 267, ed. Edward W. Cleary,
3d ed. (St. Paul, Minn., 1984).
20. See Fed. R. Evid. 611(c); McCormick, supra note 19, § 6 at 12 n.7.
21. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3); McCormick, supra note 19, § 279 at 825-26.
22. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
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If the course did nothing more than teach aspects of trial advocacy, it
would be worth the effort because it fulfills the purpose effectively and
(relatively) inexpensively. But that is not its only value; it also generates
lively discussions about the ethics and the social consequences of adversarial
litigation. Client-oriented clinics provide the material for this sort of critical
reflection, but they sometimes fail to provide the forum, because the
interests of the clients often dominate to the exclusion of other
considerations.2 3 Traditional simulation clinics have the freedom to accom-
modate this objective, but they may be too remote from reality to reach it.24
In simulations using actual witnesses, the manipulations and distortions of
trial practice are real and palpable, and yet the format permits the
participants to stop, to step out of role, and to think about what they are
doing.
One advantage of this format is that the group includes all the
participants in the process of trying cases. When the issue is the ethics or the
impact of some stratagem (failing to disclose information that would aid the
opposing party, for example, or asking a witness a question that the lawyer
knows will elicit an inadmissible answer), it is useful to hear directly from
the opposition, the judge, and the jury, and to find out how it affected
them. In addition, the students experience the consequences of the
professional conduct of the attorneys from the nonprofessional point of
view of the witnesses, and that more than anything else adds depth to their
perspective. Some of the lessons they learn this way are not only useful but
chastening.2 5
The most basic lesson about being a witness that the students learn time
and again is the inevitable and often oppressive passivity of the role. For
example, when I taught Evidence Workshop for the second time, I assigned
one of the more promising students to be the witness at the first hearing, a
personal injury case in which she was the plaintiff. She worked hard to
prepare her testimony and gave a completely realistic performance. This is
hardly surprising-she was herself, and she displayed a personality that
may serve her well as a trial lawyer: intelligent, emotional, quick, involved,
argumentative. In the process, however, she hurt her own case severely, as
23. Robert J. Condlin, Clinical Education in the Seventies: An Appraisal of the Decade, 33
J. Legal Educ. 604, 607-08 (1983); Condlin, supra note 18, at 53-59.
24. See Hegland, supra note 2; Lubet, supra note 2.
25. Robert Condlin argues forcefully that clinical education has failed to meet the objective
of teaching professional ethics to students because it has not succeeded in exposing the
two core ethical problems faced by lawyers: the manipulation of third parties by the
attorney in the service of the client's ostensible goals; and the domination of the client by
the attorney in their own interactions. Robert Condlin, The Moral Failure of Clinical
Legal Education, in The Good Lawyer: Lawyers' Roles and Lawyers' Ethics, ed. David
Luban, 317, 319 (Totowa, N.J., 1983). According to Condlin, the central reason for this
failure is that clinical students learn primarily by emulating their teachers' interactions
with the students, and not from their own interactions with an outside "cast" (clients,
adversaries, witnesses, judges, juries) or from observing the instructor's dealings with
that "cast." Id. at 324-32. Although Condlin's criticism is undoubtedly overdrawn (see
Norman Redlich, The Moral Value of Clinical Legal Education: A Reply to Professor
Condlin, in Luban, supra, at 350), it does highlight one of the advantages of the format
I have described. In this course the students learn in part by being the "cast" of outside
characters and by reviewing their experiences with those who manipulated and
dominated them.
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she and everybody else agreed-a clear example of the common observa-
tion that lawyers make lousy witnesses. Needless to say, the whole class
learned an important lesson from her experience: in general, a witness in
a common-law trial is not supposed to appear to be that sort of person.
Those who followed her avoided this trap. At the same time, however,
several students also expressed their doubts about a system of adjudication
that penalizes a witness for appearing to be the complex, honest, and
interesting person that she really is, and this led to an active debate.
The costs of failing to fit the prescribed role of witness are often visible
(at least in part) to everyone in court. The costs of conforming to the role,
however, are rarely seen or discussed. One of the fascinating lessons that
has emerged repeatedly from. the exercises is the common disjunction
between success as a witness and satisfaction.
For example, one of my students at Stanford testified for the plaintiff in
an employment discrimination case and did an excellent job. The student
attorney who prepared her was very skillful in shaping her testimony into
a low-key, factual, and detached presentation; it was extremely effective.
The witness, however, was appalled by her own performance-and she was
angry about it-because the picture that was presented distorted her
personality and her feelings. In fact, she was much more involved in the
development of the case than her manner implied, and she is not (and
would not want to be) the detached and cool person that the jury saw. By
the end of the course the class had also seen and discussed an interesting
example of the opposite problem. Another student, testifying for the
prosecution in a criminal assault case, came across just as he is and gave the
jury an accurate picture of his personality (at least in this context) and of his
views of the events he had witnessed. He was completely satisfied with his
testimony, even though he had to admit what was obvious to everyone else:
he had made the conviction he would have liked to see all but inconceivable.
There is an inevitable tension in clinical teaching between technical
training and critical reflection. Unless students are given the training and
the opportunity to become adept and independent in their professional
roles, they will lack the experience that is necessary for any serious
discussion of the ethical and social consequences of trial practice. Technical
training can, however, easily be given too large a role. Technique is
concrete and practical and tends to dominate whatever space it can fill;
preoccupation with learning the skills of practice can choke off any attempt
to consider the nature of the enterprise with detachment. The course I have
described brings together different elements in a fashion that makes critical
examination effective, necessary, and natural.
My own view of adversarial fact finding is decidedly skeptical. 26 A few of
my students may absorb some of this outlook, but not many. In general, the
students who take Evidence Workshop are intensely interested in trial
work; their goal is to learn how to do it as quickly and as well as they can.
I am familiar with this attitude: it is exactly how I felt when I was in law
26. See generally Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient
Litigation, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 734 (1987).
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school. My main aim is to help the students achieve this goal. In the process,
however, I also hope to get them to think about what they do from different
points of view, and with open minds. So far, my most apparent success is
with myself. In the process of teaching this course I have learned a great
deal about the operation of our system of adjudication, and about its
consequences.
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